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                            ----------  
  
GARTH, Circuit Judge:  
 
         William G. O'Connell, III appeals from the district 
court's order dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1).  The primary issue on appeal, which is one of first 
impression in this circuit, is whether O'Connell's punitive- 
damage claim premised on an arbitrary and willful failure to pay 
maintenance and cure is barred by the exclusivity provision of 
the Suits in Admiralty Act ("SAA"), 46 U.S.C.  745.  We hold 
that the SAA's exclusivity clause divested the district court of 
subject matter jurisdiction over O'Connell's punitive-damage 
claim, and we accordingly affirm. 
 
                                I. 
         The complaint claimed subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C.  1333, as a case of admiralty or maritime jurisdic- 
 
tion.  We are vested with appellate jurisdiction over the 
district court's 12(b)(1) dismissal of the complaint pursuant to 
28 U.S.C.  1291.  Our review of the district court's dismissal 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is plenary.  Delaware 
Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F.2d 256, 264 
(3d Cir. 1991); York Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. 
Corp., 851 F.2d 637, 638 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
1005 (1989); Haydo v. Amerikohl Mining, Inc., 830 F.2d 494, 496 
(3d Cir. 1987). 
 
                               II. 
         Plaintiff William O'Connell was employed as a merchant 
seaman aboard the M/V Gopher State, a vessel owned by the United 
States Maritime Administration ("MARAD") and operated by defen- 
 
dant Interocean Management Corporation ("IOMC"), as an agent for 
the United States.  On July 19, 1991, onboard the Gopher State, 
O'Connell accidentally severed the tendon in his left little 
finger while operating a grinding wheel. 
         On July 24, 1991, O'Connell sought treatment at St. 
Barnabas Medical Center, located in New Jersey.  Despite two 
surgical procedures and a skin graft, O'Connell will never regain 
full use of his little finger, which is permanently deformed. 
         In November 1991, O'Connell signed a release, pursuant 
to which IOMC agreed to pay O'Connell $17,500 (for lost wages) 
and all medical expenses incurred as a result of the injury 
sustained while onboard the Gopher State.  IOMC delayed paying 
O'Connell's medical expenses, however, despite O'Connell's 
numerous phone calls and letters.  In May 1994, a balance of 
$8,924.22 remained outstanding on O'Connell's medical bill from 
St. Barnabas.  Although IOMC ultimately paid the outstanding 
medical bill, it did so only after O'Connell hired an attorney 
to sue for payment. 
         On July 5, 1994, O'Connell filed the instant action, 
alleging that IOMC was liable for punitive damages in that it had 
arbitrarily and capriciously delayed paying maintenance and cure.  
Among other motions, IOMC moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), contending that 46 U.S.C.  745 
precludes a seaman's claim for maintenance and cure against a 
private operator of a vessel owned by the United States.  The 
district court granted IOMC's motion to dismiss, concluding that 
all of O'Connell's claims are within the same subject matter as a 
claim for which the SAA provides a remedy and therefore within 
the exclusivity provision.  District Court Opinion at 8.  The 
instant appeal followed. 
 
                               III. 
         Under general maritime law, a member of a ship's crew 
who was injured or became ill while serving onboard the vessel 
could recover "maintenance and cure" from the shipowner/employer.  
"The right to maintenance and cure is an ancient right given to 
seamen by the maritime law."  Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662, 
665 (3d Cir. 1992).  See generally Cox v. Dravo Corp., 517 F.2d 
620 (3d Cir.) (providing a detailed historical exegesis of the 
origin of "maintenance and cure"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1020 
(1975). 
         "Maintenance is the living allowance for a seaman while 
he is ashore recovering from injury or illness.  Cure is payment 
of medical expenses incurred in treating the seaman's injury or 
illness."  Barnes v. Andover Co., L.P., 900 F.2d 630, 633 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (citing Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962); 
Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938)).  An 
employer's obligation to furnish maintenance and cure continues 
"until the seaman has reached the point of maximum cure, that is 
until the seaman is cured or his condition is diagnosed as 
permanent and incurable."  Id. at 633-34. 
         The remedy of "maintenance and cure" is a contractual 
obligation, which is independent of the shipowner's negligence or 
even the seaman's own negligence: 
         [T]his obligation [of maintenance and cure] 
         has been recognized consistently as an 
         implied provision in contracts of marine 
         employment.  [T]he liability . . . in no 
         sense is predicated on the fault or 
         negligence of the shipowner. . . .  So broad 
         is the shipowner's obligation, that 
         negligence or acts short of culpable 
         misconduct on the seaman's part will not 
         relieve him of the responsibility. 
 Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 730-31 (1943) 
(footnotes omitted). 
         If the shipowner unreasonably refuses to pay a marine 
employee's claim for maintenance and cure, the employee may 
recover consequential damages, including lost wages, pain and 
suffering, and attorneys' fees and costs.  See Deisler v. 
McCormack Aggregates, Co., 54 F.3d 1074, 1084-85, 1087 (3d Cir. 
1995).  See also Sims v. United States War Shipping Admin., 186 
F.2d 972, 973-74 (3d Cir.) ("We may regard it as settled law that 
if a man is injured or becomes ill while on a voyage, neglect to 
fulfill the duty to provide maintenance and cure may impose 
damages beyond mere cost of food and medicines.") (citing The 
Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240 (1904)), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 
(1951).   
         Although we have yet to address the issue directly, 
some courts have allowed recovery of punitive damages against 
private shipowners who were not agents of the United States and 
who, taking a "callous" or "recalcitrant" view of their 
obligations, "arbitrarily and willfully" refused to pay 
maintenance and cure.  See Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d 
1187 (11th Cir. 1987); Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 
1048 (1st Cir. 1973).  The majority of courts, however, do not 
allow punitive damages, other than attorneys' fees, in those 
circumstances.  See Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 
1496, 1513 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 706 (1996); 
Roy Al Boat Management Corp., 57 F.3d 1495, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 708 (1996); Kraljic v. Berman Enters., 
Inc., 575 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 
                               IV. 
         As noted earlier, see supra note 1, O'Connell, in the 
instant action against IOMC, seeks compensatory damages, as well 
as punitive damages for IOMC's "arbitrary and willful" 
mishandling of his claim for maintenance and cure.  O'Connell's 
claims, which are based on an injury sustained while employed as 
a crew member of a vessel owned by the United States (through 
MARAD), are governed by the Clarification Act, 50 U.S.C. app. 
 1291, which incorporates the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA), 46 
U.S.C.  741-52.  See McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 26 
(1951); Gaynor v. Agwilines, Inc., 169 F.2d 612, 614-15 (3d Cir. 
1948), aff'd sub nom., Fink v. Shepard S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 810 
(1949). 
         The SAA and the Public Vessels Act ("PVA"), 46 U.S.C. 
 781-790, permit admiralty suits, including an action to 
enforce a seaman's entitlement to maintenance and cure, to be 
brought against the United States for causes of action arising 
out of the operation of vessels owned by, or operated for, the 
United States.  Manuel v. United States, 50 F.3d 1253, 1255 (4th 
Cir. 1995).  "Neither the SAA nor the PVA create causes of action 
against the United States.  Instead, they act only as a waiver of 
the sovereign immunity of the United States in admiralty cases."  
Id. at 1255 n.1. 
         Section 745 of the SAA, the so-called exclusivity 
provision, precludes recovery against an agent of the United 
States operating a government-owned vessel on any claim for which 
the SAA or the PVA provides a remedy against the federal 
government.  Specifically, the exclusivity clause provides that 
"where a remedy is provided by [the SAA] it shall hereafter be 
exclusive of any other action by reason of the same subject 
matter against the agent or employee of the United States . . . 
whose act or omission gave rise to the claim."  46 U.S.C.  745 
(emphasis added). 
         O'Connell argues that his claim charging an arbitrary 
and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure in a timely 
manner, which, in essence, is a claim seeking punitive damages, 
is distinct from the underlying claim for maintenance and cure.  
Because punitive damages cannot be recovered from the United 
States, see Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1254, O'Connell reasons that the 
SAA does not provide a "remedy" and therefore such punitive- 
damage claims do not fall within the purview of the exclusivity 
provision of section 745. 
         There is a split of authority among the district courts 
on this issue.  Three district court have held that section 745 
does not preclude claims for arbitrary and willful failure to pay 
maintenance and cure.  See Abogado v. International Marine 
Carriers, 890 F. Supp. 626, 632 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that 
actions for willful and arbitrary denial of maintenance and cure 
"do not fall within the exclusivity clause of  745"); Henderson 
v. International Marine Carriers, 1990 A.M.C. 400, 402 (E.D. La. 
1989) ("[P]laintiff's claim for willful and arbitrary failure to 
pay maintenance and cure must focus against the one who stopped 
the payments . . . .  [The] SAA does not provide a remedy for 
this claim; therefore, the SAA exclusivity provision does not 
apply . . . ."), aff'd mem., 921 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1990); 
Shields v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 187, 190 (M.D. Fla. 1987) 
("[S]uch arbitrary claims handling is an entirely different 
subject matter from the negligent conduct for which the SAA 
provides a remedy.").  Several other district courts have reached 
the opposite conclusion.  See Stewart v. United States, 903 F. 
Supp. 1540 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Smith v. Mar, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 75 
(D.R.I. 1995); Fratus v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. 
Va. 1994); Manuel v. United States, 846 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Va. 
1994), aff'd, 50 F.3d 1253 (4th Cir. 1995); Farnsworth v. Sea- 
Land Serv., Inc., 1989 WL 20544 (E.D. La. March 7, 1989), aff'd 
mem., 896 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 880 (1990). 
         To date, the only published court of appeals decision 
which addresses this issue is the Fourth Circuit's affirmance of 
Manuel.  In Manuel, Michael Manuel, a crew member aboard the M/V 
Cape Florida, a vessel owned by the United States and operated by 
International Marine Carriers, Inc. ("IMC"), sustained back 
injuries while lifting a water cooler cover.  50 F.3d at 1254.  
IMC paid maintenance and cure until it found Manuel fit for duty 
approximately one month later.  Id.  Manuel alleged that he 
continued to experience back pain and required continuing medical 
care after his employer determined he was fit for duty.  Id.  The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of IMC and 
denied Manuel's motion for leave to amend his complaint to state 
a claim for arbitrary and willful failure to pay maintenance and 
cure.  Id. at 1254-55. 
         On appeal, Manuel made the same argument raised by 
O'Connell in the present case:  a claim for arbitrary and willful 
failure to pay maintenance and cure when due does not fall within 
the exclusivity provision of the SAA because punitive damage 
claims do not lie against the United States.  The Fourth Circuit, 
in Manuel, acknowledged that a seaman could not bring a claim for 
punitive damages against the United States, but nevertheless 
concluded that section 745 precluded Manuel's action for 
arbitrary and willful failure to pay maintenance cure, reasoning 
that "[p]unitive damages [remedy] is merely an additional remedy 
in the seaman's maintenance and cure action."  Id. at 1260. 
         Manuel reviewed the Supreme Court precedents which 
ultimately gave rise to the 1950 Congressional amendment of 
section 745 of the SAA.  The Manuel court then reasoned:  The SAA 
requires a seaman to bring his action against the United States, 
and not its agent, to collect unpaid maintenance and cure.  
Because the subject matter of the seaman's claim is maintenance 
and cure, any arbitrary and willful failure to pay that claim 
must deal with and come within the same subject matter.  Hence, 
it cannot be regarded as a cause of action separate from the 
simple failure to pay maintenance and cure benefits when due.  
Such punitive damages can be considered no more than an 
additional remedy within the seaman's maintenance and cure 
action.  Thus the remedy provided by the SAA encompasses the 
seaman's remedy for arbitrary and willful failure to pay 
maintenance and cure benefits when due, and necessarily bars any 
such action against IOMC. 
         The Manuel court then went on to discuss the argument 
that the SAA does not provide a remedy for arbitrary and willful 
failure to pay maintenance and cure because the United States is 
not subject to punitive damages by reason of its sovereign 
immunity.  The Manuel court explained: 
         [W]e reject [the] argument that the SAA does 
         not "provide a remedy" for the arbitrary and 
         willful failure to pay maintenance and cure.  
         Manuel argues that the only remedy for the 
         arbitrary and willful failure to pay 
         maintenance and cure is punitive damages.  
         Because the SAA has not waived the United 
         States' sovereign immunity with respect to 
         suits for punitive damages, Manuel argues 
         that the SAA does not provide a remedy for 
         the arbitrary and willful failure to pay 
         maintenance and cure.  We conclude that 
         Manuel's argument merely attempts to create a 
         cause of action out of the punitive damages 
         remedy.  Manuel's action against IMC is one 
         to vindicate his entitlement to maintenance 
         and cure resulting from his injury aboard the 
         ship.  In resolving his maintenance and cure 
         action against IMC, a court may grant 
         punitive damages if it concludes that the 
         maintenance and cure benefits were 
         arbitrarily and willfully withheld.  The SAA, 
         however, allows Manuel to vindicate his 
         entitlement to maintenance and cure against 
         the United States, but the sovereign immunity 
         power of the United States limits his 
         remedies.  Nonetheless, the SAA provides a 
         remedy for Manuel's maintenance and cure 
         claim.  Section 745 therefore bars Manuel's 
         action against IMC. 
 
Id. at 1260 n.6. 
         The reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Manuel is 
persuasive, and we have no reluctance in following that rationale 
and disposition here.  We agree that an action for arbitrary 
denial of maintenance and cure benefits when due arises "by 
reason of the same subject matter" as the available claim against 
the United States for maintenance and cure.  We therefore hold 
that the exclusivity provision of the SAA bars O'Connell's claim 
for damages resulting from IOMC's arbitrary and willful failure 
to pay maintenance and cure when due. 
 
 
                                V. 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court, dated October 30, 1995, which dismissed 
O'Connell's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
